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Two experiments were designed to investigate perceivers’ self-evaluations when they 
received objectively positive above-average performance feedback but were told 
about another coactor who performed either moderately or much better than the 
participant. Results indicated that participants responded negatively to this 
comparison information even though they received better-than-average performance 
feedback. Participants were given the opportunity to evaluate themselves relative to 
another coactor who was described as performing at an average level. When the 
negative implications of the unfavorable social comparisons were relatively mild, 
both low and high self-esteem participants raised their self-evaluations vis-a`-vis the 
inferior coactor who performed at an average level on the task. However, when 
the upward comparisons were especially unfavorable (i.e., when there was a large 
discrepancy between the performance level of the participant and the coactor—the 
comparison target), only high self-esteem participants raised their self-evaluations. 
Results provided evidence for active compensation and relatively passive spreading 
activation, supporting a schema-maintenance through compensation model 
(e.g., Seta & Seta, 1982, 1993; Seta, Seta, & McElroy, 2003). 
As noted by Festinger over fifty years ago, the social environment provides us with a 
rich source of social comparison information that is helpful for self-knowledge in the 
absence of more objective forms of information (Festinger, 1954). Although this 
literature is too vast to adequately review in this paper, the research that was 
generated from his classic social comparison theory also has made it clear that social 
comparisons can be painful and can represent a threat to our ego or self-concept (see 
Collins, 1996; Suls & Wills, 1991). In this paper, we explored how individuals 
responded to information that they had performed at a level that was above average 
(i.e., received objectively positive feedback) but also were told that another 
participant performed either one rank (mild threat) or two ranks (severe threat) 
above them. A competitive context was induced in which the participants expected to 
meet with the experimenter to discuss differences in participants’ performance levels. 
These participants also were given information about a performer who had 
performed at an average level, putting this performer in a relatively inferior social 
position vis-a` -vis the participant. Thus, our procedures created a social hierarchy of 
performance comparison information in a competitive context. 
 
Control conditions also were included in which participants received either no 
information about superior others (Experiment 1) or received information about 
another performer who performed similarly to the participant (Experiment 2). We 
asked participants to make self-evaluations of their ability levels relative to the 
average-other. Based upon the view that participants would respond to these upward 
comparisons in a relatively negative way, we expected them to be motivated to 
compensate for these social comparison threats by raising their self-evaluations in 
relation to the average performer. We also included measurements of participants’ 
self-esteem levels in this research. We expected levels of self-esteem to interact with 
the social comparison threat conditions such that both high and low self-esteem 
participants would be able to compensate for mild social comparison threats but that 
low self-esteem participants would be unable to compensate for relatively severe 
social comparison threats. In contrast, we expected high self-esteem participants 
to be able to compensate for relatively severe levels of threat by raising their selfevaluations. 
Our reasoning for these predictions is discussed below. 
 
We used a schema-maintenance through compensation model (e.g., Seta & Seta, 
1982; Seta, Seta, & Erber, 1993; Seta, Seta, & McElroy, 2003) as a theoretical 
backdrop for this research. Although this model has not been applied to research in 
social comparison, it is applicable to this domain because unfavorable social 
comparisons can represent events that are inconsistent with self-related schema. For 
example, unfavorable upward social comparisons can provide information that one 
is not meeting goals for self-improvement, or can create negative affective reactions 
that are not commensurate with maintaining a positive social position. Other 
research using the schema-maintenance through compensation model has found that 
individuals respond to threats to important schemata (e.g., stereotypes) by 
generating information that at least attempts to compensate for, or balances-out, 
the threatening information (e.g., Seta et al., 1993, 2003).1 It also may be the case 
that individuals respond similarly to self-threatening information and generate 
compensatory self-relevant information. Thus, individuals also may attempt to 
balance the negative implications of social comparison threats. 
 
According to our view, compensatory effects occur when individuals are both 
motivated and able to generate (or access) information that has the potential to 
balance-out inconsistent and negative experiences. However, when individuals are 
not motivated or capable, the inconsistent event can have a direct influence and 
produces responses that are driven by the inconsistent experience. Although there 
has been research that supports these assumptions (e.g., Alter & Seta, 2005; Hughes 
& Seta, 2003; Seta et al., 1993; Seta, Seta, & Goodman, 1998; Seta, Hundt, & Seta, 
1995; Seta & Seta, 1982, 1993; Seta, Seta, & McElroy, 2003), research has not tested 
the role of these processes for the self in a context in which inconsistent experiences 
were induced by upward social comparisons. The purpose of the following research 
is to extend this model into the domain of social comparison threat. 
Compensation and spreading of activation. It is worthwhile to consider why 
individuals might be motivated to compensate for upward social comparisons when 
they have just received objective information that they performed better than 
average. Why not just accept the objectively positive feedback and ignore the social 
comparison information that others have performed better than they in the setting? 
In many cases, this may indeed occur. However, in competitive contexts upward 
social comparisons can signal an inferior social position that is associated with the 
loss of social status and the potential for rejection. This is especially likely in a 
context in which differences between persons’ performance levels are salient and 
consequential. Being outperformed by another can represent an important loss and 
comparers may attempt to compensate for this loss by providing themselves with an 
especially positive social position relative to another group member. To successfully 
accomplish this goal, a suitable target must be available—one that allows performers 
to access relatively positive self-attributes. Typically, a person holding a relatively 
inferior social position relative to performers can serve this role. Thus, because an 
above-average performers’ accomplishments are superior in comparison to those of 
the average person, performers may be able to access self-attributes that are 
relatively more positive than those of this inferior other. 
 
In addition to motivating performers to compensate for the unfavorable social 
comparison, however, the negative implications associated with this type of upward 
comparison can serve as a predictive cue for performers’ self-worth by activating 
negatively valenced self-knowledge information, which spreads outside of awareness 
and relatively automatically to associatively linked self-concepts. The result of this 
passive spreading of activation process (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Higgins, 1996), 
is an increase in the availability of negative self-information which, in turn, can 
constrain attempts to access information that compensates for the unfavorable 
comparison. 
 
When the negative implications of an unfavorable social comparison are relatively 
mild, a performer should be capable of accessing information that at least partly 
balances the unfavorable experience. However, when the negative implications are 
severe, they may reduce performers’ ability to access positive self-attributes and, 
thus, their self-evaluations may be driven by the negative implications of the 
unfavorable social comparison resulting in deflated self-evaluations. 
 
Compensation and self-esteem. If a lack of ability to access positive self-attributes 
constrains compensation following a failure experience, then person variables related 
to this factor also should affect this capability. Several studies have examined person 
factors, such as self-esteem, on perceivers’ self-evaluations following an experienced 
failure (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Brown & Gallagher, 1992; Brown & Smart, 1991). In 
general, these studies have found patterns of elevated self-evaluation following an 
experienced threat for high, but not low, self-esteem persons (for reviews concerning 
self-esteem, see Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin, 1999; Kernis, 1995). This may be 
because low self-esteem persons believe that they have relatively few resources or 
positive attributes (e.g., Brockner & Elkind, 1984; Brockner et al., 1998), or because 
they may not be confident that they can defend their positive self-views—either to 
themselves or to others (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Brown & Smart, 
1991; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). If so, then the inability of low self-esteem individuals 
to self-enhance would be due to deficiencies in cognitive abilities rather than lack of 
motivation (e.g., Seta, Donaldson, & Seta, 1999; Swann & Schroeder, 1995).2 If 
deficiencies in cognitive abilities are responsible for the failure of low self-esteem 
performers to self-enhance, then less ‘‘cognitively demanding’’ conditions may reveal 
their self-enhancing motivations. 
 
With few exceptions (see Brown & Gallagher, 1992), the vast majority of studies 
that have found especially positive self-evaluations following a negative evaluation 
have compared the responses of persons who have received negative versus positive 
evaluations (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Brown & Smart, 
1991; Dunning, Luenberger, & Sherman., 1995; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & 
Beach, 2000). Although these studies are informative about individuals’ selfevaluations 
following negative versus positive feedback, these studies do not provide 
information concerning their responses relative to a comparatively neutral control 
group in a social comparison context. Therefore, in the present studies, we compared 
the self-evaluations of performers to those who were not exposed to a threatening 
upward comparison—a control group. 
 
We also provided high and low self-esteem performers with upward social 
comparisons that represented different levels of negativity and threat, and then 
measured their self-evaluations relative to an inferior comparison target. A 
competitive environment was created. In the experimental comparison conditions, 
relative evaluations were made salient; a relatively high status evaluator was 
purportedly scheduled to objectively compare differences in the participants’ 
performance relative to those of another person who was always described as 
performing at a relatively superior level. Therefore, there was competition 
established between performers and the superior, and there were clear consequences, 
such as loss of public face, associated with this situation. Thus, it would 
be difficult for performers to alter the fact that they were different from—and 
inferior to—the superior. Our expectations were that both low and high self-esteem 
performers would be motivated to balance this negative experience by positively 
differentiating themselves from the inferior. However, low self-esteem performers— 
because of their limited ability to access positive self-attributes—should be 
especially likely to be constrained in their ability to compensate. Thus, although 
they may be capable of compensating when the unfavorable social comparison is 
relatively mild, they should be less likely to compensate when it becomes more 
severe. In fact, when exposed to a very unfavorable social comparison, the selfevaluations 
of low self-esteem persons may be driven primarily by the inferior 
experience itself. If so, then their self-evaluations would be deflated relative to 
those of low self-esteem performers who were not exposed to the unfavorable 
social comparison—a control group. 
 
 
Similarity and elevated self-evaluations. Research has shown that upward social 
comparisons may be interpreted in a positive light leading to positive affect and 
elevated self-evaluations, such as when individuals focus on the similarities between 
themselves and the superior person (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van Yperen, & 
Dakof, 1990; Buunk & Ybema, 1997; Collins, 1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). 
Thus, performers also may access positive self-attributes and raise their selfevaluations 
because they believe they are similar to the superior person. 
 
According to the selective accessibility model (e.g., Mussweiler, 2001, 2003; 
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), when perceivers believe they belong in the same 
category as the standard, they engage in similarity testing and assimilate themselves 
to the standard; they engage in dissimilarity testing, however, and contrast 
themselves away from the standard when they perceive that they and the superior 
are in different categories (e.g., Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002). In the present 
studies, we created a competitive situation and placed performers into a different 
achievement category relative to the superior; they were either one or two ranks 
below the superior. Thus, we created a situation in which performers would see 
themselves as distinct from the superior (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown, 
Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992). Differences between performers and the superior 
also had external consequences in that performers expected an important evaluator 
to compare their accomplishments to those of the superior. Thus, this type of 
setting should not induce performers to see their accomplishments as being 
interdependent or similar to those of the superior. Rather, they should see their 
accomplishments as discrepant and inferior to the superior, and they should be 
concerned about the negative consequences associated with differences in their 
achievements relative to those of the superior. 
 
Overview of Experiments 1 and 2. Two studies were designed to determine whether 
performers would elevate their self-views as a compensatory response to an 
unfavorable social comparison. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that high 
and low self-esteem participants would differ in their ability to compensate for 
this comparison threat. Specifically, we expected both low and high self-esteem 
performers to elevate their self-evaluations when the social comparison threat was 
relatively mild and expected only high self-esteem participants to be capable of 
this form of compensation when the threat was relatively severe. In fact, when 
faced with a relatively severe threat, the self-evaluations of low self-esteem 
performers may be deflated relative to comparatively neutral control group 
performers. 
 
In Experiment 2, we measured performers’ negative affective reactions as well as 
their self-evaluations. Comparisons to superior others were expected to produce 
negative affect. Furthermore, levels of negative affective reactions should be most 
intense when the difference between the participant and the comparison target is 
relatively large. Therefore, we expected to observe the most intense negative affective 
reactions in the condition in which participants were confronted with the 
accomplishments of a very superior person, less intense negative affect reactions 
when the comparison target was only somewhat superior, and the least intense 
reactions when the accomplishments of performers were similar to those of the 
target. If elevated social comparisons are compensatory in nature, then we should 






Experiment 1 was designed to determine whether performers would view themselves 
in a more positive light (relative to the inferior average participant) in response to a 
threatening upward social comparison than in the absence of such a comparison. It 
was also designed to determine whether these self-evaluations varied as a function of 
self-esteem level. In particular, we expected both high and low self-esteem 
participants to be able to compensate for relatively mild social comparison threats 
but expected that only our high self-esteem participants would be able to compensate 
for more severe threats. Thus, we expected Experiment 1 to reveal a self-esteem by 
social comparison condition interaction. 
Method 
 
Participants and design. One hundred sixteen UNCG female undergraduate 
psychology students participated in this experiment for partial course credit. Our 
sample was composed of all women because women composed the vast majority of 
the available participant pool and we wanted to maintain a homogeneous 
comparison context. Participants were assigned randomly to experimental conditions. 
A between-subjects design was utilized in which we varied three levels of social 
comparison information (no comparison control, superior comparison target, and 
very superior comparison target). In addition, we divided participants at the median 
level of self-esteem scores (Median¼32), creating two levels of a self-esteem variable 
(high and low). In the control condition, participants were given feedback about 
their performance level but were not given information about another performer. In 
the social comparison information conditions, participants were given feedback 
about their performance and that of either a superior or a very superior performer. 
There were, on average, 8 to 12 participants per session. 
 
Procedure. Individuals participated in small groups of 8 to 12 per session and 
experimental conditions were randomized within each session. At the beginning of 
the session, participants were given the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem inventory. 
After the completion of this inventory, participants were given a copy of the Social 
Cognitive Aptitude Test (SCAT). This is a bogus test developed by Crocker and her 
colleagues (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987). The cover sheet of 
the SCAT test consisted of basic instructions and portrayed the test as an indicator 
of social and cognitive abilities. Female students who have been asked about tasks 
that are diagnostic of cognitive abilities have indicated that they are self-relevant 
(Seta et al., 1999). 
 
The test consisted of six observations of different couples, and participants were 
asked to rate the likelihood that each couple would stay together for more than one 
year. They were then informed that they had 10 minutes to complete the test and told 
that they would be receiving feedback following the performance phase of the 
experiment. After completion of this task, test booklets and answer sheets were 
collected. Participants were told that the tests would be taken to an assistant for 
grading. After a delay in which participants waited quietly in their seats, results were 
returned to participants. 
 
It is important to note that participants were not aware of the other performer’s 
identity, did not observe this performer’s activities, and did not interact with the 
performer in any way. Also, because the experimental manipulations were induced via 
typed instructions, participants were able to perform the task simultaneously, unaware 
of how others performed and unaware of the information that anyone else was given. 
All participants read that the lowest possible score on this test was 50, and the 
highest possible score was 150 and that the average score of all introductory 
psychology students at UNCG who took this test was 100. In all conditions, 
participants read that they received a score of 111 and that the experimenter planned 
to meet with them to discuss possible reasons for potential differences in 
performance. In the 111-control condition, they were given their score (111) and 
the average student’s score (100) whereas, in the superior performer conditions, they 
also were given information that they would be compared with another performer 
(described as ‘‘the other person you will be interacting with’’). In the two 
performance comparison conditions, participants were given information about 
another performer. In the superior condition, they read that, ‘‘the other person you 
will be interacting with scored 132;’’ in the very superior condition, they read that, 
‘‘the other person you will be interacting with scored 143.’’ 
Although participants were given the range of possible scores, it still might be 
difficult for them to objectively evaluate their score relative to that of another 
performer. Therefore, we provided additional information. In the superior 
condition, the other person’s accomplishments placed her in a category that was 
one rank above that of participants; whereas in the very superior condition, this 
information placed her in a category that was two ranks above. In both conditions, 
participants read that, because of these ranking differences, ‘‘the two of you are not 
in the same performance group.’’ 
 
All participants read that, because they might be asked to perform a conceptually 
similar task, we wanted them to predict how well they would perform on the 
subsequent task. They were told that the extent to which they could accurately 
predict their performance on this task would contribute to their overall performance 
evaluation. Participants were then presented with two comparative self-evaluation 
measures. They were asked to evaluate their performance relative to the average 
other performer by rating their performance relative to the average student who took 
this test on a 101-point scale (where 0 represented ‘‘very below average’’ and 100 
represented ‘‘very superior’’). They also were asked the likelihood that they would 
beat the average student who took this test using a similar 101-point scale (where 0 





Comparative self-ratings. The two comparative self-rating questions (performance 
measure and likelihood measure) were entered into a MANOVA including the 
between-participant factors of self-esteem (top ½ and bottom ½) and three levels of 
performance comparison: no other person; superior (132); and very superior 
performer (143). Consistent with expectations, this analysis revealed a significant 
Self-Esteem x Performance Comparison multivariate interaction F(2, 110) = 4.24, 
p5.02. No other effects reached significance with alpha set at .05; there was, 
however, a performer comparison condition main effect that approached significance, 
F(2, 110) = 2.90, p < .06. The individual univariate tests were examined and 
revealed significant Self-Esteem6Condition interactions for both the relative performance 
measure, F(2, 110) = 3.27, p < .05, and the likelihood of outperforming 
the average student measure, F(2, 110) = 3.64, p < .05. No other effects were 
significant in the univariate analyses. 
 
Following the suggestions of Keppel (1991), the significant interactions were 
decomposed into a set of logical interaction comparisons, similar to simple effects 
tests. Specifically, ‘‘miniature’’ factorial designs were created from the original 
complex factorial structure in order to isolate the features of the independent 
variables responsible for the 2-way interactions. 
 
First, relative performance and likelihood ratings were analyzed as a function of 
self-esteem level (high and low) within only the control and superior conditions. 
These analyses revealed a significant comparison condition main effect for the 
likelihood measure, F(1, 73) = 4.76, p < .05, and no significant interactions 
involving level of self-esteem for either measure. As may be seen in Table 1, 
participants raised their relative self-evaluations from the control to the superior 




In contrast, the corresponding interaction contrast comparing the control and very 
superior conditions produced a significant interaction between Self-Esteem Level 
and Comparison Condition for the likelihood measure, F(1, 74) ¼ 6.01, p 5 .05, 
and approached significance for the relative performance measure, F(1, 74) ¼ 3.86, 
p ¼ .055. Follow-up simple comparisons revealed that high self-esteem participants 
significantly raised their self-evaluations on the likelihood of outperforming the 
average student measure from the control to the very superior condition, 
F(1, 74) ¼ 12.77, p 5 .05, whereas low self-esteem participants descriptively 
decreased their estimates of out-performing the average student from the control 
to the very superior condition, F(1, 74) ¼ 1.95, p 5 .20. 
A final orthogonal interaction contrast was performed analyzing high and low selfesteem 
participants’ self-evaluations as a function of the superior (132) and very 
superior (143) comparison conditions. This analysis revealed significant interactions 
between Condition and Self-Esteem for both the relative performance measure, 
F(1, 73) = 5.95, p < .02, and for likelihood estimates of out-performing the average 
other (i.e., likelihood measure), F(1, 73) = 4.67, p < .05. Follow-up simple 
comparisons showed that low self-esteem participants significantly lowered their self-
evaluations from the superior to very superior condition in terms of their likelihood 
estimates of out-performing the average student, F(1, 73) = 6.55, p < .05, and on the 
relative performance measure, F(1, 73) = 4.85, p < .05. In contrast, high self-esteem 
participants’ evaluations were not lower in the very superior versus the superior 
condition. There was no difference between these conditions on the likelihood measure 
F<1 whereas on the relative performance measure, participants raised their self-evaluations 
from the superior to the very superior conditions, F(1, 73) = 3.62, p < .07. 
 
We also treated self-esteem as a continuous variable in a multiple regression 
analysis in which we dummy-coded the comparison condition and included the 
interaction between self-esteem and comparison conditions as predictor variables. 
The average of the two self-evaluation measures was used as the dependent variable. 
(The correlation between the two measures was r =.63, p <.01.) This analysis 
revealed a significant Self-Esteem6Condition interaction, F(2, 113) = 16.91, 
p < .01. Thus, the regression approach and the ANOVA analyses produced 
conceptually and statistically similar outcomes. 
 
In sum, these results suggest that both high and low self-esteem participants 
responded similarly to comparison information that another person performed one 
rank above them. However, when the social comparison feedback indicated that 
another person was very superior (i.e., two ranks above the participants), high and 
low self-esteem participants showed different patterns of self-evaluations. Relative to 
controls, low self-esteem participants tended to lower their ratings of self (both 
relative performance and likelihood measures) whereas their high self-esteem 
counterparts significantly raised their estimates of out-performing the average 





In this experiment we sought to determine whether elevated self-evaluations would 
follow from unfavorable social comparisons. To answer this question, we included a 
control group in which participants were not exposed to a social comparison threat 
as well as conditions in which the level of social comparison threat was varied. 
Results indicated that both high and low self-esteem participants had especially 
positive self-evaluations following mild social comparison threats. They did not, 
however, have similar self-ratings following exposure to a very superior (143) 
performer. In the more extreme upward comparison context, high self-esteem 
performers had elevated self-ratings whereas their low self-esteem counterparts did 
not. In fact, low self-esteem performers tended to demonstrate deflated self-ratings 
after exposure to a very superior performer. Therefore, when the failure experience 
itself was not especially intense (as in the superior performer condition), high and 
low self-esteem persons did not differ in their tendencies to compensate. In contrast, 
when the discrepancy between individuals’ performance and that of the performer 
 
was very large, as in the very superior condition, only high self-esteem persons were 
able to elevate their self-evaluations. 
 
According to our analysis, these results were obtained because high self-esteem 
persons had the ability to access positive self-attributes whereas low self-esteem 
persons did not. And, because low self-esteem persons were constrained in their 
ability to access positive self-attributes, the failure experience had a direct influence, 
resulting in deflated self-views. 
 
The procedures used in Experiment 1 make it unrealistic to believe that our 
participants learned specific skills from observing the superior performer (e.g., 
Bandura, Blanchard, & Ritter, 1969). Participants were only given information 
about the superior performers’ scores, not about the superior performers’ activities. 
And, because all of our participants were given the full range of potential scores on 
this task, it is unlikely that there were differences in participants’ knowledge 
concerning scores that could or could not be attained as a function of comparison 
conditions. In addition, by placing participants and the superior performer into 
different categories and by making differences that existed between them impactful, 
we made it likely that their elevated self-ratings were the result of the negative 







Experiment 1 did not provide direct evidence for the hypothesis that participants’ 
elevated self-ratings were driven by the negative psychological implications of 
unfavorable social comparisons (i.e., negative affect). Therefore, Experiment 2 was 
designed to determine whether elevated self-ratings were related to the negative affect 
generated by the social comparison threats. This finding would support the 
reasoning that heightened self-evaluation effects occurred as a form of compensation 
for the negative implications of unfavorable social comparisons. In addition, this 
finding should rule out explanations based upon views that participants believed that 
they were similar to the superior performers (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990; Collins, 1996); 
this type of assimilation affect should not produce negative affect. Because we 
explicitly made salient differences in the rank of the participants and the comparison 
targets, we did not expect results that would support assimilation effects. Thus, we 
expected the most intense negative affective reactions when participants were to be 
compared to a very superior person, a less intense reaction when the comparison 
target was only somewhat superior and the least intense reaction when the scores of 
performers were described as similar to those of the comparison target. 
 
In Experiment 1, superior and very superior condition participants were given two 
sources of comparison information (the score of the average person and the score of 
the comparison target) whereas participants in the no performance comparison 
condition were given only one (the score of the average person). Furthermore, 
although participants in the superior and very superior performer condition did not 
interact with the performer, they expected this interaction in the future. Participants 
in the no performance comparison condition were not given this information. 
Therefore, across conditions, participants in Experiment 1 may have had different 
expectations concerning their future interactions. To be sure that this was not a 
critical factor, Experiment 2 was designed to give all of our participants identical 
information concerning their future interactions; all participants were told that they 
would meet with the experimental assistant and were not told that they would 
interact with the comparison target in the future. And to keep the presence (or 
absence) of the performer constant across conditions, we changed the ‘‘no 
performance comparison’’ condition to one in which participants learned about 
the performance of another individual. In this condition, the score given to 
participants was relatively similar to the one given to the performers. Consequently, 
participants should demonstrate a lesser degree of negativity in this situation, 






Participants and design. One hundred forty-three female undergraduate students 
participated in this experiment for partial course credit. We varied three levels of 
performance comparison (109: similar, 132: moderately superior and 143: very 
superior) in a between-subjects design. In addition, we measured participants’ self-esteem 
and included it as a variable in the design, resulting in a 3 (comparison 
condition: similar, moderately superior, and very superior)62 (self-esteem: high or 
low, based on a median split at 32) between-subjects design. 
 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1 and 
participants were assigned randomly to experimental conditions. Following the 
administration of Rosenberg’s self-esteem inventory, participants took the self-relevant 
test (SCAT) and were provided (bogus) feedback about the range of scores 
possible on the test (50 – 150). They were provided with the average student’s score 
(100). Across all conditions, participants were told that they had scored 111, and 
were given the score of another person. In the similar performance comparison 
condition, participants were told that the other participant had scored 109; in 
the superior condition they were told that the other person had scored 132; in the 
very superior condition they were told that the other person had scored 143. 
Following the presentation of these results, participants in the similar condition were 
informed that they were in the same performance category as the other performer 
whereas performers in the superior and very superior comparison conditions were 
told that they were not in the same performance category. As in Experiment 1, we 
further highlighted differences in the scores of the superior and very superior 
performers; superior condition participants were told that they were in a 
performance category that was one rank below the other performer whereas those 
in the very superior conditions (143) were informed that they were two ranks below 
the other performer. Therefore, not only was the other performer’s score higher in 
the very superior versus superior condition, but the other performer was described as 
having a superior rank as well. 
 
All participants were told that the experimenter would meet with them to discuss 
possible differences between their performance and that of the other person. 
Following this information, participants were told that they might perform this task 
again and that part of their overall score would be determined by their ability to 
predict their own performance on a different, but conceptually similar, test; the 
second test would contain questions that were different from those on the first test 
but measured the same performance abilities as the first test. Following the collection 
of the dependent variables described below, participants were thanked and fully 
debriefed. 
 
Measures. As a manipulation check, participants were asked how they would rate 
the score the other person obtained on the first test, relative to their own score, where 
0 represented ‘‘very below average,’’ 50 represented ‘‘about equal to,’’ and 100 
represented ‘‘very superior.’’4 To determine their affective state, participants were 
asked to consider their present feelings in light of their performance and that of the 
other person and to rate each of four adjectives in terms of how characteristic each 
was of their present feelings. The ratings were made on a 7-point scale where 1 
represented ‘‘not at all characteristic’’ and 7 was ‘‘totally characteristic.’’ We 
included two negatively valenced adjectives (‘‘frustrated’’ and ‘‘not at all pleased’’— 
as a qualified adjective) and two positively valenced ones as well (‘‘happy’’ and 
‘‘satisfied’’). 
 
We then asked participants several self-rating questions. First, they were asked 
two comparative questions worded in the manner described in Experiment 1. They 
were also asked two additional questions: how they would rate their performance 
and how they would rate the performance of the average student who took this. 
Participants’ responded on a 101-point scale where 0 represented ‘‘very below 
average’’ and 100 represented ‘‘excellent.’’ 
 
The evaluative test used in this research involved both cognitive and social 
competencies. Therefore, we also included questions that involved social competencies. 
Questions of this type have been used in prior research dealing with 
evaluations of self and others (Alicke, Klutz, Breitenbecher, & Yurak, 1995). 
Participants were asked to rate themselves relative to the average person on the 
attributes of ‘‘dependability’’ and ‘‘maturity.’’ Specifically, they were asked how they 
would rate themselves as a dependable person, compared to the average student, 
and how they would rate their maturity compared to the average person on a 
101-point scale where 0 represented ‘‘not at all’’ and 100 represented the extreme 
(‘‘extremely’’ for the dependability question or ‘‘or exceptionally high’’ for the 
maturity question). They were also asked questions about dependability and 
maturity in a noncomparative manner (‘‘How dependable (mature) would you rate 
yourself? How dependable (mature) would you rate the average student?’’). The 
101-point scale described above was adapted to these questions. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Manipulation checks. We performed a 2 (high and low self-esteem) x 3 (similar, 
superior, and very superior performance comparison condition) ANOVA in which 
we used participants’ comparative ratings of how they judged the performance of the 
other person relative to their own performance as the dependent variable. The 
analysis revealed a performance comparison main effect, F(2, 105)=16.7, p <.001. 
There were no other significant effects (all ps greater than .5). Participants in the 
similar performance comparison condition rated the other person’s performance as 
‘‘about equal’’ to their own (M = 54.84) and indicated a lower relative standing in 
comparison to ratings of the performer described in the superior (M=64.72) and 
very superior (M = 78.13) conditions, F(1, 105) = 12.1, p < .05; F(1, 105) = 64.3, 
p <.001, respectively. In addition, participants in the very superior performance 
comparison condition rated the other performer as having a higher relative ranking 
relative to those in the superior condition, F(1, 105) = 22.2, p <.001. 
 
Thus, the manipulations were impactful and established differences in participants’ 
perceptions about the comparison other’s performance levels relative to their 
own performance. Furthermore, these data demonstrate that participants did not 
put themselves in the same category as the superior performers described in the 
superior and very superior conditions. These data are important in ruling out 
explanations based upon participants’ assimilation to superior others in these 
conditions. If this had been the case, one would expect that participants in the very 
superior and superior conditions would have rated themselves as being approximately 
equal to their comparison target. However, this was not the case. As we will 
discuss, performers’ negative affect scores also do not support this conclusion. 
Self-evaluations. A primary question addressed in this study concerned whether 
perceivers’ self-evaluations following unfavorable social comparisons would be 
elevated as a function of the level of discrepancy between the comparer and the 
comparison target. In addition, we examined the role that participants’ level of selfesteem 
played in determining the effects of an unfavorable social comparison. To 
address these questions, we examined participants’ self-evaluations relative to the 
‘‘average person.’’ Questions that tapped these dimensions asked for separate ratings 
of self and the average student and were used to obtain a difference score, calculated 
by subtracting participants’ ratings of the average student from their judgments of 
themselves for each specific evaluation dimension (for performance, for maturity, for 
dependability). The difference score measures and the comparative rating measures 
were significantly related, alpha¼.65, p5.05, and were, therefore, averaged to 
create a single composite index of relative self-evaluation. 
 
These composite scores were entered into a between-subjects ANOVA including 
three levels of performance comparison information (control-similar, superior-132, 
very superior-143) and two levels of self-esteem (high and low). The analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of level of self-esteem, F(1, 137) = 10.58, p < .01; high selfesteem 
participants rated themselves more positively (M=48.98) than did their low 
self-esteem counterparts (M=44.38). In addition, the main effect of performance 
comparison condition was significant, F(2, 137) = 5.05, p 5 .01. Tukey HSD tests 
revealed significant differences between evaluations in the control-similar condition 
(M¼44.88) and the superior-132 condition (49.80), p5.05, but did not reveal 
significant differences in comparisons with the very superior-143 condition 
(M=45.35). Therefore, participants raised their self-evaluations following upward 
comparisons to a superior performer, but not following comparisons with a very 
superior performer. 
 
These main effects were qualified by a significant Self-Esteem6Performance 
Comparison Condition interaction, F(2, 137) = 6.09, p < .01. Because this interaction 
was expected from Experiment 1 and from our theoretical perspective, we 
conducted planned and orthogonal contrasts on specific cell means. As may be seen 
in Table 2, although there were no significant differences between the self-evaluations 
of high and low self-esteem participants in the control condition (F<1), both high 
and low self-esteem participants’ self-evaluations were significantly more positive in 
the superior than in the control condition, Fs(1, 137) = 4.07, 4.15, respectively for 
high and low self-esteem participants ps5.05. Comparisons also indicated low selfesteem 
participants’ self-evaluations decreased significantly from the superior to the 
very superior comparison condition, F(1, 137) = 14.85, p < .05 and were lower than 
those obtained in the control condition, F(1, 137) = 3.98, p < .05. In contrast, for 
high self-esteem participants, self-evaluations were significantly more positive in the 
very superior than in the control condition, F(1, 137)=5.9, p <.05. These data 
provide a conceptual replication of the results of Experiment 1 and support our 
theoretical analysis. 
 
We also performed a regression analysis on the composite self-evaluation scores 
treating self-esteem as a continuous variable and including comparison condition 
(dummy-coded) and the Self-esteem6Comparison Condition interaction term as 
predictor variables. Consistent with the results of the ANOVA, we obtained a 
significant Self-esteem6Comparison Condition effect, F(2, 137)=8.17, p <.01.5 
 
Negative affect. To obtain a negative affect score for each participant, we reverse 
scored the two positively valenced adjectives. Because there was a significant positive 
correlation between the reverse scored positively valenced and negatively valenced 
adjectives, r =.67, p <.01, we combined these adjectives in computing the negativity 
score for each participant. We performed a 2 (high and low self-esteem)63 (similar, 
superior and very superior performance comparison) between-subjects ANOVA 
with participants’ negative affect scores as the dependent variable. The analysis 
revealed a performance comparison main effect, F(2, 137) = 20.41, p < .01. No 





If our procedure was effective then performers should be concerned about the 
negative consequences associated with differences between their accomplishments 
and those of the superior. Thus, they should experience heightened levels of negative 
affect when they anticipate a comparison to this person; and their affective reactions 
should be most intense when there are large differences between their accomplishments 
and those of the superior. 
 
Tukey HSD tests revealed that our procedure was effective. The comparison main 
effect was due to the fact that participants experienced a lesser degree of negative 
affect in the similar (M=9.6) than in the superior (M=13.1) and very superior 
performance comparison conditions (M=15.5), ps <.05. In addition, participants 
reported higher levels of negative affect in the very superior than in the superior 
performance comparison condition, p5.05. 
It is important to note that, although differences in the reactions of high and low 
self-esteem individuals to failure are relatively common (e.g., Kernis & Waschull, 
1995), participants’ level of self-esteem did not affect their negative affective 
reactions in the present study. Our procedure created a situation that was 
competitive with clear and important external consequences. In this situation, the 
threat to performers’ social standing was strong enough to eliminate negative 
affective differences related to self-esteem. We would note, however, that different 
patterns of negative affect scores could be obtained under different conditions. 
It is also important to note that although the omnibus ANOVA revealed no 
differences in high and low self-esteem participants’ level of negative affect (F<1), 
the analyses of self-evaluations revealed an interactive effect of self-esteem. This 
pattern suggests that the negative implications of the unfavorable social comparison 
motivated both low and high self-esteem performers to compensate for the 
unfavorable social comparison. Because of differences in their abilities to access 
positive self-attributes, however, high self-esteem performers were able to 
compensate whereas low self-esteem performers were not. Thus, differences between 
low and high self-esteem performers’ self-evaluations occurred because of differences 
in their abilities to compensate for negative affect, not because they differed in the 
amount of experienced negativity.6 Furthermore, our procedure provided performers 
with feedback about the accomplishments that were highly believable, as 
evidence by the fact that low and high self-esteem performers had similar evaluations 
in the control conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Correlation analysis. If increases in self-evaluations result from motivations to 
compensate for the negative affect generated by unfavorable social comparisons, 
then we should find positive correlations between self-evaluations and felt negative 
affect. In support of this reasoning, in the superior performer comparison condition, 
there were positive correlations between the negative affect and comparative 
evaluation scores of both low, r=.40, p <.05; and high self-esteem participants, 
r=.48, p5.05. These patterns suggest that as negative affect increased, so too did 
the positivity of participants’ comparative evaluations. Therefore, both high and low 
self-esteem participants were able to engage in compensatory self-evaluations when 
the threat posed by the social comparison was relatively mild. This relationship is in 
line with our predictions. 
 
We also expected a divergence in the patterns of high and low self-esteem 
participants’ self-evaluations under conditions of more extreme social standing 
threat (very superior condition). In this case, we predicted and found low self-esteem 
persons’ self-evaluations to be relatively low (in relation to the superior condition 
and in relation to high self-esteem participants). 
 
In support of this reasoning, the comparative evaluations of low self-esteem 
participants decreased as their experienced negative affect increased, r=7.48, 
p5.05. In contrast, the self-evaluations of high self-esteem participants were 
positively, although not significantly, correlated with negative affect, r=+.13. The 
divergence in the correlations obtained for high and low self-esteem performers 
supports the view that low self-esteem performers were less capable of accessing 
positive self-attributes than their high self-esteem counterparts. The fact that the 
positive correlation obtained for high self-esteem performers was not significant 
suggests that the highly unfavorable social comparison may have constrained (or 
 






The combined results of this experiment revealed several significant effects. First, 
because of their inferior social position vis-a` -vis the superior low and high self-esteem 
participants had heightened and similar levels of negative affect. Further, as 
our manipulation check measures indicated, they also had depressed ratings of 
themselves relative to the superior. In response to a modestly unfavorable 
comparison, both low and high self-esteem participants raised their ratings relative 
to the inferior average person. However, an especially unfavorable social comparison 
induced elevated ratings for high self-esteem participants, but not for their low self-esteem 
counterparts. In fact, low self-esteem participants had deflated ratings in this 
condition. Furthermore, our results supported the conclusion that differences in 
ability, not perception or motivation, were the primary determinants of differences in 





In Experiments 1 and 2, we expected performers to be concerned about the negative 
consequences associated with the difference between their accomplishments and 
those of a superior other. To achieve this end, we created a competitive situation that 
was overseen by an evaluative other. The results of Experiment 2 supported the 
effectiveness of our manipulation in that performers’ negative affective reactions 
were most intense in the condition in which they were confronted with the 
accomplishments of a very superior person who was two ranks above them, less 
intense when the comparison target was one rank above, and least intense when the 
accomplishments of performers were similar to those of the comparison target. 
The results provide evidence that our performers considered their accomplishments 
to be different from those of the superior and that these differences had negative 
implications to them. 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 were also designed to determine whether both high and low 
self-esteem persons were capable of elevating their self-evaluations vis-a` -vis an 
inferior person when the social comparison threat was relatively mild. In this 
situation, the failure experience was not especially intense in that performers’ 
accomplishments were only one rank below those of the superior comparison target. 
Furthermore, the intensity of the unfavorable social comparison was softened by the 
fact that participants’ absolute performance score was described as somewhat better 
than average. Therefore, although the feedback concerning the task was impactful to 
participants and was significantly more negative than in the control condition, it was 
not very intense. And because it was not especially intense, low self-esteem 
performers were able to elevate themselves relative to an inferior, leading them to 
demonstrate a compensatory response that was comparable to their high self-esteem 
counterparts. In this situation, support for compensation was obtained because the 
self-evaluations of participants who experienced an unfavorable social comparison 
was more positive than those who had not experienced this threat. Further support 
for compensation was obtained by considering the relationship between participants’ 
self-evaluations and their affective reaction to the mildly unfavorable social 
comparison. As their negative affective reaction to the unfavorable social 
comparison increased, their positive self-evaluations vis-a` -vis an inferior increased. 
 
Prior work (e.g., Seta et al., 1999) has shown that self-enhancement tendencies are 
influenced by how directly tied the information is to performers’ self-views (see 
Crocker & Wolfe, 2001, for a discussion of how contingencies of self-worth influence 
perceivers’ reactions). The present results suggest that, when a task has important 
consequences vis-a` -vis performers’ social standings, low self-esteem performers were 
capable of compensating for unfavorable upward comparisons as long as its intensity 
was not too great and a ‘‘compensatory friendly target,’’ such as an inferior other, 
was available. However, only high self-esteem persons were capable of compensating 
when there was a large discrepancy between their achievement level and that of the 
comparison target, as in the very superior performance comparison condition. This 
was the case even though both high and low self-esteem participants experienced 
equivalent levels of negative affect in the superior comparison condition. 
 
The schema maintenance through compensation model. In addition to building on 
prior work concerning compensatory reactions that implicate the self (e.g., 
Baumeister, 1982; Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Brown & Smart, 1991; Seta et al., 
1999), the results of the present studies add to research following from a schema— 
maintenance through compensation analysis (e.g., Alter & Seta, 2005; Hughes & 
Seta, 2003; Seta & Seta, 1992, 1993; Seta et al., 1998, 2003). According to this 
approach, three events are necessary for compensation to occur (Seta & Seta, 1992, 
1993; Seta et al., 1993, 2003): (1) an event or experience must be perceived to be 
inconsistent with a schema, goal, or expectation; (2) the person must have an implicit 
or explicit motivation to maintain the schema; and (3) the person must have the 
ability to generate information that can partly balance the inconsistent event. All 
three of these conditions are met by the conceptual variables explored in this 
research and the differences in the abilities of high and low self-esteem persons to 
compensate for failure experiences fit squarely within the domain of this model. 
Thus, a parsimonious account of compensatory motivations in the context of 
unfavorable social comparisons is offered by the schema-maintenance through 
compensation model (Seta & Seta, 1992, 1993; Seta et al., 1993, 2003). 
 
The results of several studies have supported the motivational assumptions of this 
model (e.g., Seta & Seta, 1982, 1993; Seta et al., 1993, 2003). For example, when 
confronted with information that was inconsistent with their stereotype, individuals 
compensated for an inconsistent event (via expectations and attributions) when they 
were motivated to maintain the stereotype, but not when they were not motivated (e.g., 
Seta et al., 1998, 2003). Other research (Seta & Seta, 1982) has demonstrated that 
failure can induce compensation in a context in which children worked for a very 
positive goal (a valuable toy); children inflated the goal’s worth after experiencing either 
a relatively mild or relatively severe failure experience. Because of their motivation to 
maintain consistency between input (cost) and obtained output (the toy), participants 
compensated for the failure experience by raising the perceived worth of the goal. 
Studies also have supported the constraint assumptions of this analysis. A 
person’s ability to generate compensatory information can be constrained by the 
predictive cue properties of the inconsistent act. For example, an inconsistent act for 
which a particular group member is directly responsible is especially predictive of 
this group member’s character and future actions; however, it is only marginally 
predictive of the characters of fellow group members—those who are only indirectly 
related to the inconsistent act(s) via their group affiliation. Thus, perceivers have 
been shown to expect compensation from a fellow group member, but not from the 
group member who was associated directly with the inconsistent action (e.g., Seta & 
Seta, 1993; Seta et al., 2003). 
 
Compensation also has been shown to be constrained by the properties of 
compensatory targets. Because there are more aspects to discover about highly 
valued goals, it took larger amounts of effort (input) to constrain individuals from 
matching the perceived worth of the goal to their efforts when the goal was high 
versus low in value (e.g., Seta & Seta, 1982; Seta et al., 1993). When compensation is 
constrained, perceivers’ evaluations have been shown to be driven by the inconsistent 
experience, itself. This has been shown to result in a goal’s devaluation following 
either large expenditures of effort or failure experiences (Seta & Seta, 1982; Seta 
et al., 1993), in lowered expectations about the future behavior of a group member 
who was directly responsible for an inconsistent action (e.g., Seta & Seta, 1993; Seta 
et al., 1998) and in less positive internal attributions concerning the behavior of an 
individual who was directly associated with the negative and inconsistent behaviors 
of multiple group members (Seta et al., 2003). 
 
The above-described results, coupled with those of the present studies, suggest 
that compensation is a motivated process that occurs whenever inconsistency 
threatens either social or self-schemata; just as perceivers in past studies were 
motivated to expect compensation after they were given information that was 
inconsistent with their stereotype, performers in the present studies were motivated 
to compensate following an unfavorable social comparison. And, just as perceivers 
have been shown to be constrained in the ability to compensate for highly 
inconsistent behaviors of a member of a stereotyped group, low self-esteem 
performers were constrained in their ability to compensate following a relatively 
severe social comparison threat. Participants’ responses in both the present research 
and in our research dealing with violations of stereotypes demonstrated the direct 
implications of inconsistent experiences as well as the direct implications of the 
failure experience on participants’ judgments. 
 
In the present research, as in our past work, we see two processes at work. One 
process that attempts to compensate for the schema-threatening event and one that 
is driven directly by the nature of the inconsistent or threatening event per se. For 
example, following a failure experience, the process of compensating for the negative 
experience is constrained by the process of the failure experience spreading 
automatically to associatively linked knowledge units. Thus, to understand the 
effects of a failure experience, we must understand the interplay between these two 
processes. In the present studies, the intensity of the unfavorable social comparison 
(a contextual factor) coupled with self-esteem (a person factor) influenced the 
relative strengths of these two processes. 
Better-than-average effects. The better-than-average (BTA) effect refers to the 
finding that, across a variety of dimensions, people believe, on average, that they 
have characteristics that are more positive than those of others (e.g., Alicke, 1985; 
Alicke et al., 1995; Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Codol, 1975; Gibbons, 
Helweg-Larsen, & Gerrard, 1995; Goethals, Messick, & Allison, 1991; Messick, 
Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Weinstein, 1980). It is a robust phenomenon 
that has been observed across a variety of domains, including estimates of the 
likelihood of positive and negative events (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), and intelligence 
and fairness (Allison et al., 1989). 
 
Cognitive and motivational reasons have been implicated as the cause of this 
general effect (Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Wills, 1981). To the extent that the BTA 
effect is a motivated bias, it should be influenced by threats to participants’ relative 
social standing. Consistent with this reasoning, we found that, compared to a control 
group, both low and high self-esteem performers elevated their self-worth relative to 
the average performer following a moderately threatening upward comparison. 
These effects occurred under conditions in which the participants received 
performance feedback that was objectively positive and better than the average. In 
raising their self-evaluations, they indicated that they were ‘‘better than better-than-average.’’ 
However, because low self-esteem persons were constrained in their ability 
to compensate, only high self-esteem persons elevated their self-worth following a 
relatively severe threat. Therefore, self-esteem and the magnitude of the threatening 





Social comparison information is readily available in our everyday environment. And 
it is often the case that the persons with whom we interact possess attributes and 
abilities that are superior to our own. This is especially true for persons in very 
competitive environments. The results of the present studies suggest that, when faced 
with an inferior social position, the intensity of the unfavorable social comparison 
coupled with self-esteem determined whether performers would or would not 
compensate for their unfavorable position, by inflating their self-ratings relative to an 
inferior. Certainly, the idea that individuals seek to maintain positive and consistent 
characteristics of themselves and the social world is not unique. This view has a long 
tradition in social psychology (e.g., Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, 
Rosenberg, & Tannenbaum, 1968; Aronson, 1969; Festinger, 1957). Building on this 
tradition, the present research allows us to more fully understand when individuals 






1. Individuals also are motivated to avoid events that are inconsistent with important 
schemata. 
 
2. Seta et al. (1999) found that low self-esteem persons demonstrated a stronger 
selfenhancement 
response relative to high self-esteem persons on a task that was low in 
self-relevance but only high self-esteem persons were able to self-enhance in a highly 
self-relevant task. The low self-relevance task used in the Seta et al. (1999) study was 
conceptually similar to the mildly dissonance producing situation employed in the 
Steele, Spencer, & Lynch (1993) study, in which low self-esteem persons were seen to 
be especially inclined to rationalize the negative implications of a decision. 
 
3. In the superior and very superior conditions, we also asked participants questions 
about their performance in relation to the superior performer. Importantly, their 
expectation of the score they would receive was not correlated with their comparative 
self-evaluation suggesting that comparative evaluations were not the result of an 
association with the superior performer. We have not discussed these measures in 
detail because, in Experiment 2, we provided a more direct test of whether performers’ 
elevated self-ratings were a response to an upward comparison threat or a result of an 
association with a superior performer. 
 
4. Several participants appeared to misunderstand our manipulation check questions. 
Inspection of the original question for the first 32 participants indicated that a few 
participants did not respond. Therefore, we revised our question to make it more 
understandable for participants and substituted this wording for the remainder of the 
participants. Clarity was achieved by rewording the question and providing a midpoint 
on the scale. We based our manipulation check analysis on the revised question. 
 
5. For exploratory purposes, we also performed an ANOVA considering the task related 
(e.g., performance ratings) versus indirectly related (dependability, maturity) attributes 
as repeated measures as an additional component of the design. Although there was a 
marginally significant main effect of the measure variable F (1, 137)¼3.06, p5.10, 
there were no significant interactions involving either self-esteem or performance 
condition and the measure variable. This dimension may not have mattered in the 
present study because the attributes of dependability and maturity do have some 
implications for task performance, given the SCAT involved making judgments about 
the likelihood of couples remaining in relationships and was described as measuring 
both social and cognitive skills. Thus, these measures involve the same construct. In 
addition, these questions were answered in close temporal proximity and were not 
presented as distinctly different from one another. The major findings involving the 
significant interaction between self-esteem and condition, of course, still held in this 
analysis and provided support for the major hypothesis underlying this research. 
 
6. Our affect measure involved participants’ ratings of how characteristic each of four 
adjectives (two negatively valenced and two positively valenced ones) was of their 
present feelings. The measure was effective in that large differences were obtained 
across conditions. However, we asked participants to consider their present feelings in 
light of their performance and that of the other person. A question arises as to whether 
similar findings would be obtained if we did not give them this directive. In an earlier 
pilot study participants were asked to rate adjectives in terms of how characteristic 
they were of their present feelings without being asked to consider their feelings in light 
of their performance vis-a` -vis the other performer. This study included a neutral 
control condition and one in which participants were compared to a mildly superior 
performer. As in the present study participants reported higher levels of negative affect 
and high self-evaluations relative to an inferior in the mildly superior condition than in 
the control condition. Rating how characteristic adjectives are to participants’ feelings 
is a common measure of affect. However, it can be less sensitive than physiological 
measures in that participants may attempt to conceal their true feelings and behave in 
a socially appropriate manner. Thus, even though this measure was sensitive in the 
present study, a more subtle measure may be needed in situations in which 
participants’ are attempting to mask their affective reactions. 
 
7. Although not the primary question motivating this research, the design of Experiment 
2 allowed us to assess how the target of rating (self and average other) was affected by 
social comparison information. Specifically, individuals can compensate for unfavorable 
social comparisons by elevating/accessing positive aspects about themselves and/ 
or by creating/accessing negative aspects of others. The general findings from the 
analysis of self – other ratings indicated that only high self-esteem persons were able to 
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